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Abstract 
In an election contest, a losing candidate a can manipulate the election outcome in his favor by introducing a weak 
similar candidate WSC in the choice set, the WSC b being defined as an alternative which is ranked immediatly below 
a in the individual preferences. We characterize the voting situations where this manipulation is efficient for the Borda 
rule and express its vulnerability for a 3 alternative election.
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     1 Introduction
From the theorem of Gibbard-Satterthwaite (1973, 1975) asserting that all
reasonable voting procedures are sensitive to manipulation by strategic vot-
ers, an important literature has been developed on the possible strategies
of voters and their eﬃciencies. Recently, a diﬀerent way of acting upon
the election result has arisen. By changing the set of alternative to choose
rather than the preferences, the ﬁnal outcome might be radically diﬀerent
and favour the manipulators. Saari proved (1989, 1990) that adding or re-
moving a candidate may aﬀect seriously the ranking of scoring rules. Dutta
et al. (2001) asserted that all reasonable voting procedures are sensitive to
strategic candidacy, i.e., a candidate can alter the election outcome by de-
ciding whether or not to enter the set of candidates.
In this paper, we will focus on a speciﬁc way of changing this set suggested
by Dummett (1998) that he called agenda manipulation. A losing candidate
may try to manipulate the election outcome by promoting the candidacy of
a Weak Similar Candidate (WSC), i.e., another candidate who is considered
almost similar to him by all the voters 1. Dummett noticed that the Borda
rule may suﬀer from this manipulation and gave some examples such as in
Example 1.
The Borda rule (see Borda 1781) belongs to the class of point ranking rules
where points are given to each candidate according to his rank in the prefer-
ence of the voters. When n voters have to choose among m alternatives, each
one assigns m − r points to the candidate with the rank r in his individual
preference. The Borda score of a candidate is the amount of points that he
collects and the chosen candidate is the one with the highest Borda score.
In Example 1, eleven voters have to choose among four alternatives a, b, c,
and d. Each column represents a preference ordering, with the number of
individuals with this speciﬁc preference, and the last column represents the
number of points that a voter gives to a candidate according to his rank.
Example 1
2 3 2 1 2 1 points
b c c a b b 3
d d a b a a 2
a a d d d c 1
c b b c c d 0
In this example, a is chosen with a Borda score of 18 (17 for b, 16 for c and
15 for d). Dummett assumes that before the vote is taken, a ﬁfth alternative,
1Dummett called this new candidate a clone but we prefer to deﬁne it as weak similar
because a clone could be considered as equivalent to his genuine candidate. For diﬀerent
deﬁnitions of a clone, see Laslier (1999), Tideman (1987) and Zavist and Tideman (1989).
1e, is introduced by d, whom every voter ranks immediately below d. The
chosen candidate among this new choice set is now d with a Borda score of
26 (24 for a, 23 for b, 22 for c, and 15 for e).
As the reader can notice, this manipulation is suﬃciently powerful to make d
chosen while he had the lowest Borda score with the initial voting situation.
In this example, the manipulation can radically change the outcome in favour
of the manipulator and it is natural to raise the question of the theoretical
likelihood of this manipulation. The procedure suggested by Gerhlein and
Fishburn (1976) to obtain analytical representation of the probability of an
event is of great interest for our purpose. Their method being diﬃcult to
apply for this type of manipulation, we use the algorithm provided by Huang
and Chua (2000)2 derived from the method of Gehrlein and Fishburn.
Basic notions and assumptions are introduced in Section 2. We characterize
the voting situations where the manipulation by introduction of a WSC can
be successful, present the method of Huang and Chua and give the vulnera-
bility of the Borda rule to this manipulation in a three-candidate election in
Section 3. We discuss results in Section 4.
2 Notations
Let X be the set of possible alternatives and A3 a ﬁnite subset of X, with
|A| = m. The set of individuals who choose among the candidates is I =
{1,...,i,...,n} with |I| = n. We assume that the individuals are able to
rank all the alternatives without ties in X. The preferences on a ﬁnite subset
A are the restriction of Pi on A. The six possible preference orderings over
A will be numbered as follows when A = {a,b,c}:
Table 1
n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6
a a c c b b
b c a b c a
c b b a a c
A voting situation is a vector s = (n1,n2,n3,n4,n5,n6), with nt the number
of type t voters and
P6
t=1 nt = n, that gives the distribution of the n voters
over the six possible preference types. Sn is the set of all possible voting
situations. A social choice function (SCF) g : ∪n
i=1Sn → A, assigns to each
voting situation a nonempty subset of A, g(A). We shall assume throughout
the paper that the social decision for the context A only depends upon the
2See also Gehrlein (2002)
3The cardinality of A will vary when an attempt of manipulation by introduction of a
WSC takes place.
2restriction of the preferences in the proﬁle on A4. Nxy is the number of
voters who prefer x to y in a voting situation s. In case of a tie, we use the
lexicographic order to choose the winner.
The deﬁnition of a WSC we give, expresses the idea of a candidate creating
another candidate always immediately ranked after him in the individual
preferences.
Deﬁnition 1 A candidate y is a Weak Similar Candidate of x for a voting
situation s if and only if:
∀z ∈ X \ {x,y}, ∀i ∈ I, xPiz ⇐⇒ yPiz and ∀i ∈ I, xPiy
Given a voting situation s, we say that the Borda rule is sensitive to manip-
ulation by introduction of a WSC at s if the outcome of a vote is better for
a candidate when his WSC is introduced in the context. The vulnerability
of the Borda rule will be the number of voting situations where this rule is
vulnerable to this manipulation at s when compared with the number of all
possible voting situations.
3 Vulnerability to Dummett’s manipulation
We characterize the voting situations at which the Borda rule is sensitive
to this manipulation. Lemma 1 describes the case where only one losing
candidate manipulate while the other losing candidate doesn’t react.
Lemma 1 Suppose m = 3 and consider a voting situation s = (n1,n2,n3,n4,n5,n6).
The Borda rule is sensitive to single manipulation by introduction of a WSC
at s if and only if:
Sab
B,s ≥ 0 and Sac
B,s ≥ 0 and h
(Nba > Sab
B,s and Nbc ≥ Scb
B,s) or (Nca > Sac




B,s > 0 and Sbc
B,s ≥ 0 and h
(Nab ≥ Sba
B,s and Nac ≥ Sca
B,s) or (Ncb > Sbc




B,s > 0 and Scb
B,s > 0 and h
(Nac ≥ Sca
B,s and Nab ≥ Sba
B,s) or (Nbc ≥ Scb




• We assume that the Borda rule is sensitive to single manipulation by in-
troduction of a WSC and a chosen initially: Sab
B,s ≥ 0 and Sac
B,s ≥ 0.
The candidate b creates d. We obtain the following voting situation s0:
4This is not the condition of Independance of Irrelevant Alternatives of Arrow(1963):
in a context A, the social preference between x and y may depend upon all the preferences
on A, not only on the pair {x,y}. But the preference on {x,y} is not inﬂuenced by z,
which is not in the menu A.
3n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 points
a a c c b b 3
b c a b d d 2
d b b d c a 1
c d d a a c 0
The new Borda scores are :
Sa
B,s0 = Sa
B,s + Nab, Sb
B,s0 = Sb
B,s + n, Sc
B,s0 = Sc
B,s + Ncb and Sd
B,s0 = Sb
B,s
b is chosen if he beats the other candidates. As d is a WSC of b, d is always
beaten by b.
b beats a if the diﬀerence between their new score is strictly positive which
is equivalent to write Nba > Sab
B,s and b beats c if the diﬀerence between their
new score is positive which is equivalent to write Nbc ≥ Scb
B,s.
• We assume Sab
B,s ≥ 0 , Sac
B,s ≥ 0 , Nba > Sab
B,s and Nbc ≥ Scb
B,s.
Sab
B,s ≥ 0 and Sac
B,s ≥ 0 implies a chosen.
Nba > Sab
B,s ⇐⇒ Sb
B,s + n > Sa
B,s + Nab
⇐⇒ 3(n5 + n6) + 2(n1 + n4) + n2 + n3 > 3(n1 + n2) + 2n3 + n6 (1)
Nbc ≥ Scb
B,s ⇐⇒ Sb
B,s + n ≥ Sc
B,s + Ncb
⇐⇒ 3(n5 + n6) + 2(n1 + n4) + n2 + n3 ≥ 3(n3 + n4) + 2n2 + n5 (2).
The conditions (1) and (2) correspond to the fact of having yet 6 preference
types and 4 candidates as Borda gives now 3 points for a top candidate. One
property of the Borda rule is that each voter of type nt gives m(m−1) points
to the candidates. As we know that there is 4 candidates and the number
of points given by each voter of type nt for a, b and c we ﬁnd that the new
candidate d is always ranked after b in the individual preferences. We con-
clude that d is a WSC of b. From the conditions (1) and (2) we know that b
is chosen: the Borda rule is sensitive to single manipulation by introduction
of a WSC. The other cases are similar and we omitt them. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 describes the situations where the two losing candidates create
simultaneously a WSC. They act upon the choice set simultaneously but
with a diﬀerent aim. Each losing candidate introduces a WSC of him in
order to be chosen.
Lemma 2 Suppose m = 3 and consider a voting situation s = (n1,n2,n3,n4,n5,n6).
The Borda rule is sensitive to simultaneous manipulation by introduction of
a WSC at s if and only if
Sab
B,s ≥ 0 and Sac
B,s ≥ 0 and (Sb
B,s > Sab
B,s + Nac and Sbc
B,s ≥ Ncb − Nbc)
Sab
B,s ≥ 0 and Sac
B,s ≥ 0 and (Sc
B,s > Sac
B,s + Nab and Scb
B,s > Nbc − Ncb)
Sba
B,s > 0 and Sbc
B,s ≥ 0 and (Sa
B,s ≥ Sba
B,s + Nbc and Sac
B,s ≥ Nca − Nac)
Sba
B,s > 0 and Sbc
B,s ≥ 0 and (Sc
B,s > Sbc
B,s + Nba and Sca
B,s > Nac − Nca)
Sca
B,s > 0 and Scb
B,s > 0 and (Sa
B,s ≥ Sca
B,s + Ncb and Sab
B,s ≥ Nba − Nab)
Sca
B,s > 0 and Scb
B,s > 0 and (Sb
B,s ≥ Scb
B,s + Nca and Sba
B,s > Nab − Nba)
4Proof of Lemma 2
• We assume that the Borda rule is sensitive to simultaneous manipulation
by introduction of a WSC and a chosen initially. We have Sab
B,s ≥ 0 and
Sac
B,s ≥ 0
We assume that b is chosen after the partisans of b and c have acted upon
the choice set by creating WSC d and e. We have the following proﬁle s0
n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 points
a a c c b b 4
b c e e d d 3
d e a b c a 2
c b b d e c 1
e d d a a e 0
The new Borda scores are :
Sa
B,s0 = Sa
B,s + Nab + Nac, Sb
B,s0 = Sb
B,s + n + Nbc, Sc
B,s0 = Sc
B,s + n + Ncb,
Sd
B,s0 = Sb
B,s + Nbc and Se
B,s0 = Sc
B,s + Ncb.
b is chosen if he beats the other candidates. As d is the WSC of b, d is always
beaten by b:
b beats a if the diﬀerence between their new score is strictly positive: Sba
B,s0 >
0, which is equivalent to write Sb
B,s > Sab
B,s + Nac.
b beats c if the diﬀerence between their new score is positive: Sbc
B,s0 ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to write Sbc
B,s ≥ Ncb − Nbc
e is the WSC of c so we have always Sce
B,s0 ≥ 0, as Sbc
B,s0 ≥ 0 it implies Sbe
B,s0 ≥ 0.
• We assume Sab
B,s ≥ 0 , Sac
B,s ≥ 0 ,Sb
B,s > Sab
B,s + Nac and Sbc
B,s ≥ Ncb − Nbc.
Sab
B,s ≥ 0 and Sac
B,s ≥ 0 implies a chosen.
Sb
B,s > Sab




B,s + Nba + Nbc > Sa
B,s + Nac
⇐⇒ Sb
B,s + Nba + Nbc + Nab > Sa
B,s + Nac + Nab
⇐⇒ Sb
B,s + n + Nbc > Sa
B,s + Nab + Nac
⇐⇒ 4(n5 + n6) + 3n1 + 2n4 + n2 + n3 > 4(n1 + n2) + 2(n3 + n6) (1)
Sbc
B,s ≥ Ncb − Nbc ⇐⇒ Sb
B,s + n + Nbc ≥ Sc
B,s + n + Ncb
⇐⇒ 4(n5 +n6)+3n1 +2n4 +n2 +n3 > 4(n3 +n4)+3n2 +2n5 +n1 +n6 (2)
The conditions (1) and (2) correspond to the fact of having yet 6 preference
types but with 5 candidates as Borda gives now 4 points for a top candidate.
We know that the number of candidates and the number of points given by
each voter of type nt for a, b and c so we ﬁnd that the two new candidates
d and e are always ranked respectively after b and c in the individual prefer-
ences. We conclude that d and e are respectively the WSC of b and c. Borda
rule is sensitive to simultaneous manipulation by introduction of a WSC. The
other cases are similar and we omitt them. Q.E.D.
5The lemmas 1 and 2 give a complete characterization of the voting situations
where the manipulators are able to win after manipulation by introduction of
a WSC (single or simultaneous). Let CM(n) be the set of these voting situa-
tions. The conditions that characterize CM(n) can be translated in terms of
the nt’s. We assume each voting situation to be equally likely to occur ( this is
the Impartial Anonymous Culture condition used by Gehrlein and Fishburn
(1976)). Under this assumption, it is possible to obtain a polynomial repre-
sentation for the number of elements in CM(n) as a function of n and write
the polynomial as follows: |CM(n)| = x5n5 +x4n4 +x3n3 +x2n2 +x1n+x0.
Huang and Chua (2000) proved that there exists a periodicity e for the se-
quence of these polynomials 5, and provide an algorithm in order to ﬁnd the
periodicity and the coeﬃcients of the diﬀerent polynomials CM(n). Thus,
for 6 values of n (= r+e, r+2e, r+3e, r+4e, r+5e), the same polynomial
will give the number of voting situations where the manipulation can occur.
We use computer enumeration to evaluate exact values for the number of the
situations characterized by Lemmas 1 (resp. Lemmas 2) for each n = 1 to
145 (resp. 91). We set up 6 equations with 6 unknowns (x0,x1,...,x5) and
solve the 6 simultaneous equations. The algorithm allows us to ﬁnd that the
periodicity e is 24 (resp. 15) for single (resp. simultaneous) manipulation.
Finally, we divide the cardinality of CM(n) by the total number of situa-
tions, and obtain the following representations for the vulnerability of the
Borda rule to this manipulation.
V(B1, r(e)) (resp. V(B2, r(e))) is the vulnerability of Borda rule to single




1909n5 + 24420n4 + 111750n3 + 208580n2 + 94221n − 440880
3072(n + 1)(n + 2)(n + 3)(n + 4)(n + 5)
V (B2,1(15)) =
1023n5 + 12900n4 + 58745n3 + 109260n2 + 32280n − 214208
1875(n + 1)(n + 2)(n + 3)(n + 4)(n + 5)
5See Huang and Chua (2000) for a general proof.
6Table 2: Vulnerability of the Borda rule to
manipulation by introduction of a WSC
n B1 n B2
1 0 1 0
2 0.4286 2 0.2857
3 0.3571 3 0.3571
4 0.4127 4 0.3333
5 0.4524 5 0.4087
6 0.4675 6 0.4026
7 0.4735 7 0.4090
8 0.5012 8 0.4312
9 0.5055 9 0.4380
10 0.5115 10 0.4469
11 0.5240 11 0.4560
12 0.5294 12 0.4584
13 0.5346 13 0.4628
14 0.5399 14 0.4711
15 0.5445 15 0.4753
16 0.5490 16 0.4776
17 0.5530 : :
18 0.5552 : :
19 0.5584 : :
20 0.5622 : :
21 0.5642 : :
22 0.5656 : :
23 0.5687 : :
24 0.5707 : :














∞ 0.6214 ∞ 0.5456
4 Concluding remarks
Our results (see Table 2) show the great vulnerability of the Borda rule to this
manipulation. When compared with the manipulation attempted by voters
misrepresenting their individual preferences, we see Borda being more vul-
nerable to manipulation by introduction of a WSC than voters manipulation.
7In an election contest of three candidates when n is large the vulnerability of
the Borda rule to manipulation by a coalition of strategic voters is about 50%
(see Favardin, Lepelley, Serais 2002) whereas it is 62% (resp. 55%) for single
(resp. simultaneous) manipulation by introduction of a WSC. These results
reinforce the intuition of Dummett about the importance of this manipula-
tion. However, this manipulation is a very speciﬁc case of manipulation by
changing the choice set. If one doesn’t impose speciﬁc conditions over the
entering candidate, it could be the case that the Borda rule may be more
robust than other positional rules. This conjecture is inspired by Gehrlein
and Fisburn (1980) who looked at the likelihood of a positional rule to give
the same ranking of candidates when one modiﬁed the choice set by elim-
inating one (resp. one or two) losing candidate from the choice set in the
case of a three (resp. four) candidate election. They proved that, in each
case, the Borda rule is the positional rule which maximizes the probability
of giving the same ranking after the modiﬁcation of the choice set. So, if we
reverse this way of thinking, it can be conjectured that Borda maximizes the
probability of giving the same ranking when adding a losing candidate to a
choice set of two or three candidates.
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